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Adapters
The SDK captures agents you wrote. Adapters capture the rest: model traffic behind a gateway, framework spans, runs inside the OpenAI Agents SDK, and finished calls a voice platform reports by webhook. Each supplements the SDK; none replaces it: a gateway sees only what crosses it.
- OpenAIEvery model call, and handoffs between agents
- AnthropicEvery model call
- LangChainChains, tools and retrievals as they run
- LLLiteLLMEverything behind your gateway, including agents you did not write
- VapiFinished calls, and proof the AI disclosure played
- OpenTelemetryWhatever you already trace
- Amazon S3Write-once storage, where not even we can delete
LiteLLM gateway
One callback line captures every model call from every agent behind the gateway (including agents whose source you don't control), with MCP tool calls promoted to first-class tool_call events rather than buried in metadata.
callbacks: auditant.gateway.handler
curl $GATEWAY/v1/chat/completions \
-H "Authorization: Bearer sk-agent-loan-underwriter" \
-H "x-auditant-agent: loan-underwriter" \
-H "x-auditant-session: sess_b0f9c646" \
-d '{"model":"gpt-4.1","messages":[…]}'OpenAI Agents SDK
Nothing to add: when the agents package is importable, init() registers Auditant on the SDK's trace-processor bus and says so in handle.activated. The manual form remains for hosts that wire things themselves. It is idempotent, so calling both never chains a span twice.
import auditant handle = auditant.init(api_key="ak_…", log_id="t_…/prod", agent_id="support-bot") # "openai-agents-trace-processor" in handle.activated # or, with init(instrument=False): from auditant.openai_agents import install install(handle)
generation / response → model_call tokens observed function → tool_call name + input/output hashes handoff → delegation which agent handed to which guardrail (triggered) → policy_decision blocked, on the chain
Handoffs matter more than they look: multi-agent delegation is the case supervisors name as hardest to reconstruct, and here it is a first-class chained event.
Voice & vendor webhooks
Voice platforms report finished calls by webhook; the ingest endpoint maps them to lifecycle, per-turn decisions, tool calls, and a first-class disclosure event recording whether the “you are talking to an AI” line was actually played on this call, which nobody else produces as provable record.
POST /v1/ingest/voice/vapi?log=t_…%2Fprod x-vapi-secret: <AUDITANT_WEBHOOK_SECRET>
POST /v1/ingest/voice/retell?log=t_…%2Fprod
x-auditant-webhook-secret: <AUDITANT_WEBHOOK_SECRET>
{ "callId": "call_…", "agentId": "receptionist",
"transcript": […], "toolCalls": […], "costs": {…} }Vapi connects directly. Retell signs its own vendor-shaped webhook, so a small relay verifies x-retell-signature before mapping the call to the canonical body above; the same route works for any audio loop. The Auditant webhook secret is deliberately not the API key: it can write events and do nothing else: leaking it costs spam, never disclosure.